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Abstract	
This	 article	 considers	 corruption	 in	 Australia	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 exploitation	 and	
preservation	of	natural	resources.	In	doing	so,	it	examines	issues	pertaining	to	a	proposed	
pulp	mill	and	the	forestry	industry	in	Tasmania,	the	development	of	mining	and	ports	in	
Queensland,	and	international	agreements	pertaining	to	deep‐sea	oil	drilling	in	the	Timor	
Sea.	Corruption	relating	to	the	environment	is	interpreted	in	this	article	as	implying	both	
moral	 corruption	and/or	direct	 corruption.	Gaining	unfair	advantage,	protecting	 specific	
sectoral	interests	and	over‐riding	existing	environmental	regulations	are	all	features	of	the	
types	of	corruption	associated	with	the	exploitation	of	natural	resources.	The	result	is	lack	
of	 transparency,	a	substantial	democratic	deficit,	and	expenditure	of	public	monies,	 time	
and	resources	in	support	of	environmentally	and	socially	dubious	activities.		
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Introduction	
This	article	considers	corruption	in	Australia	in	relation	to	the	exploitation	and	preservation	of	
natural	 resources.	 In	 doing	 so,	 it	 examines	 issues	pertaining	 to	 a	 proposed	pulp	mill	 and	 the	
forestry	 industry	 in	 Tasmania,	 the	 development	 of	 mining	 and	 ports	 in	 Queensland,	 and	
international	agreements	pertaining	to	deep‐sea	oil	drilling	in	the	Timor	Sea.	Concepts	such	as	
securitisation	and	state‐corporate	crime	are	drawn	upon	to	explain	corruption	in	relation	to	the	
natural	resource	extraction	industries.	The	exploitation	of	natural	resources	is	both	global	and	
capitalist	in	nature	and,	while	the	benefits	are	presented	in	universalising	terms	(‘we	all	profit	
from	this’),	in	practice,	they	reflect	the	specific	sectional	interests	of	transnational	corporations	
and	 state	 elites.	 Similar	 trends	 are	 likewise	 evident	 in	 the	 Australian	 context	 and	 form	 the	
substance	of	the	present	article.	
	
Before	 delving	 into	 the	 substance	 of	 the	 article	 and	 the	 linkages	 between	 corruption	 and	
securitisation	of	nature,	a	few	words	about	terminology	are	in	order.	Corruption	relating	to	the	
environment	is	interpreted	as	implying	both	moral	corruption	(involving	the	undermining	of	trust	
and	 respect	 for	 established	 governmental	 processes	 and	 institutional	 practices,	 as	 guided	 by	
democratic	 over‐sight)	 and/or	 direct	 corruption	 (involving	 direct	 breaches	 of	 criminal	 laws,	
facilitated	by	government	officials	and	non‐government	actors).		
	
Environmental	security	refers	to	the	idea	that	natural	resources	such	as	fresh	water,	fish,	trees,	
coal	and	gas	need	to	be	protected	and	secured	first	and	foremost	for	the	public	benefit	of	those	
living	within	particular	nation‐states.	Popular	rhetoric	about	the	national	interest	and	business	
health	can	both	obscure	and	bolster	that	fact	that	environmental	security	tends	to	be	constructed	
around	very	particular	private	and	state	interests.	At	a	concrete	level,	the	social	construction	of	
‘security’	 in	 an	 environmental	 context	 frequently	 privileges	 the	 rights	 and	 interests	 of	 the	
powerful	 over	 the	public	 interest.	 Thus,	 environmental	 security	more	often	 than	not	 is	 about	
protecting	financial	interests	rather	than	ensuring	fair	and	equal	access	for	all.	Who	‘the	powerful’	
are,	in	turn,	has	to	be	considered	from	the	viewpoint	of	specific	industries,	corporations	and	firms	
as	well	as	specific	governmental	formations	ranging	from	the	local	municipality	and	provincial‐
level	through	to	the	nation‐state.		
	
Securitisation	of	nature,	in	this	context,	refers	to	the	ways	in	which	particular	governments	and	
nation‐states,	 and	particular	 corporations,	 ensure	 the	 security	of	 their	 investments	 in	natural	
resources	(often	for	the	short	term)	at	the	expense	of	ecological	wellbeing	and	the	collective	social	
welfare.	In	pursuit	of	the	ownership	and	control	over	natural	resources,	and	to	exploit	these	for	
particular	purposes,	governments	and	companies	have	singularly	and	in	conjunction	with	each	
other	worked	to	break	laws,	bend	rules	and	undermine	participatory	decision‐making	processes.	
Sometimes	 this	 takes	 the	 form	 of	 direct	 state‐corporate	 collusion	 (state‐corporate	 crime);	 in	
other	instances,	it	involves	manoeuvring	by	government	officials	or	company	executives	to	evade	
the	normal	operating	rules	of	planning,	development	and	environmental	impact	assessment.		
	
By	 examining	 specific	 instances	 of	 corruption	 (broadly	 defined),	 this	 article	 exposes	 the	
particular	interests	and	institutional	processes	that	underpin	fundamentally	unjust	practices.	The	
article	begins	by	outlining	the	strategic	importance	of	natural	resource	extraction	for	Australia	
and	 the	 longstanding	global	push	 to	 secure	particular	 resources	 for	 economic	advantage.	The	
discussion	of	securitisation	maps	the	larger	political	economic	context	within	which	moral	and	
direct	 corruption	 in	 favour	of	 particular	 class	 interests	 occurs.	The	 article	 then	 considers	 the	
specific	issue	of	corruption	in	Australia	as	this	pertains	to	the	exploitation	of	natural	resources	
across	several	different	sectors:	namely,	forestry,	mining,	and	oil	and	gas	extraction.	
	
Natural	resource	extraction	and	securitisation	
Resource	extraction	industries	are	the	economic	lifeblood	of	countries	such	as	Australia.	Mining,	
forestry	and	the	petroleum	industries	(involving	drilling	at	sea	and	on	land),	as	well	as	coal	seam	
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gas	extraction,	constitute	major	sources	of	revenue	and	profit	for	the	state	and	corporations	alike	
(Cleary	 2012;	Munro	 2012).	 They	 also	 demand	 huge	 expenditures	 from	 the	 point	 of	 view	 of	
investment,	exploration,	operations	and	rehabilitation.	Resource	extraction	is	not	cheap.	Yet	the	
rewards	 are	 great	 (for	 the	 few)	 as	 are	 the	 environmental	 and	 social	 costs	 (for	 the	majority)	
(Carrington,	 Hogg	 and	McIntosh	 2011;	White	 2013).	 Natural	 resources	 are	 seen	 to	 be	 vitally	
important	to	national	economies	and	corporate	profits,	especially	where	overall	gross	domestic	
product	 is	 reliant	 upon	 these	 types	 of	 industries.	 Yet	 the	 capitalist	 exploitation	 of	 natural	
resources	is	neither	new	nor	progressive,	at	least	from	the	point	of	view	of	world	economic	and	
political	developments	(Ruggiero	and	South	2013).		
	
For	the	past	four	hundred	years,	the	extraction	of	natural	resources	on	a	global	scale	(for	example,	
gold	and	other	precious	metals,	furs,	spices	and	wood	products)	has	fundamentally	been	a	project	
of	displacement	and	destruction.	Indeed,	the	history	of	the	modern	world	is	based	precisely	upon	
resource	 colonisation,	 a	 phenomenon	 that	 has	 had	 an	 adverse	 impact	 on	 many	 different	
Indigenous	peoples	in	places	such	as	South	America,	North	America	and	Australasia,	as	well	as	
the	native	 inhabitants	 of	Africa,	Asia	 and	beyond	 (White	2011b).	 Across	 the	planet,	 the	prior	
ownership	rights,	interests	and	knowledge	of	Indigenous	inhabitants	were	treated	as	irrelevant	
by	the	European	invaders.	People	who	for	thousands	of	years	had	lived	in	harmony	with	Nature	
(that	is,	 through	intrinsically	adopting	ecologically	sustainable	practices),	 including	in	some	of	
the	most	humanly	inhospitable	places	in	the	world	(such	as	Arctic	tundra	and	sand	deserts),	were	
subjected	to	dispossession,	displacement	and	destruction	of	their	communities.	These	processes	
are	mirrored	in	the	contemporary	exploitation	of	natural	resources	worldwide,	which	continues	
to	hugely	affect	Indigenous	communities	(Gedicks	2005;	Klare	2012;	Le	Billon	2012).		
	
Since	the	Industrial	Revolution	of	the	mid‐1700s	in	Europe,	the	specifically	capitalist	character	of	
industrialisation	 has	 transformed	 nature	 in	 particularly	 degrading	 ways	 and	 contributed	 to	
ecological	 imperialism	 on	 a	 world	 scale	 (Greig	 and	 van	 der	 Velden	 2015).	 The	 industrial	
revolution	era	has	been	driven	and	underpinned	by	powerful	forces	(nation‐states,	companies,	
armies)	 pursuing	 sectional	 interests.	 This	 has	 been	 achieved	 through	 global	 imperialism,	
colonialism	and	militarism	that	have	served	to	entrench	a	dominant	worldview	and	the	material	
basis	for	certain	types	of	production,	consumption	and	reproduction.	Carbon	emissions	that	lead	
to	global	warming,	for	example,	occur	in	the	pursuit	of	‘normal’	business	outcomes	and	involve	
‘normal’	business	practices	(see	Rothe	and	Kauzlarich	2016;	Tombs	and	Whyte	2015).	The	major	
contributors	to	carbon	emissions	can	be	identified	through	reference	to	specific	industries,	such	
as	the	‘dirty	industries’	of	coal	and	oil,	and	how	they	engage	in	particularly	damaging	practices	
(Heede	 2014).	 But	 the	 overarching	 imperative	 to	 expand	 and	 increase	 production	 and	
consumption	nonetheless	is	the	same	for	all	industries	plugged	into	the	global	capitalist	mode	of	
production.	Built	into	the	logic	and	dynamics	of	capitalism	is	thus	the	imperative	to	grow.	The	net	
effect	of	this	is	anthropogenic	climate	change.		
	
Who	 is	 most	 negatively	 affected	 by	 resource	 extraction	 is	 partly	 a	 function	 of	 what	 can	 be	
exploited,	where	it	is	located,	and	how	much	resistance	is	likely	to	be	encountered.	This	is	also	at	
the	heart	of	the	link	between	resource	extraction	and	corruption,	as	will	be	demonstrated	shortly.	
The	mega‐mining	 developments	 of	 contemporary	Australia,	 for	 example,	 are	 affecting	 a	wide	
spectrum	 of	 people,	 ranging	 from	 particular	 Indigenous	 communities	 (for	 example,	 in	 the	
Northern	Territory)	through	to	the	farmers	of	the	Hunter	Valley	(pastoralists	as	well	as	wine‐
makers).		
	
The	presence	and	activities	of	the	extraction	industries	equate	to	the	use	of	oceans,	mountains,	
rivers,	 trees	 and	 lands	 for	private	profit.	 This	 generally	 involves	 the	 commodification	of	both	
nature	 and	human	 labour,	 as	 each	 is	 regarded	 first	 and	 foremost	 in	 terms	of	 the	buyer‐seller	
nexus.	Trees,	copper	and	 fish	are	sold	 for	 the	profits	 they	make,	not	because	of	 their	 intrinsic	
usefulness	 to	 humans	 (although	 it	 is	 their	 use‐value	 that	 provides	 the	 grounding	 for	 their	
subsequent	 exchange‐value	 in	 the	 market	 place);	 human	 labour	 is	 bought	 as	 a	 tradable	
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commodity	 on	 the	 labour	market	where	workers	 are	 interchangeable.	 The	market	 dominates	
social	life,	and	one	consequence	is	the	concentration	of	power	into	fewer	and	fewer	hands	in	the	
same	moment	that	disparities	in	wealth	and	poverty	expand	worldwide.	Three	decades	of	neo‐
liberalism	have	seen	the	 further	 intense	exploitation	of	nature	(ecosystems	and	the	abiotic	or	
non‐living,	such	as	rivers)	without	restraint,	the	exploitation	of	the	nonhuman	(animals,	plants)	
without	 respect,	 and	 the	 exploitation	 of	 humans	 (workers	 and	 consumers)	without	 empathy.	
Capitalism	 is	 comprised	 of	 certain	 types	 of	 productivist	 practices	 supported	 by	 particular	
consumerist	ideologies.	The	result	is	often	human‐induced	scarcity.		
	
Shortages	of	food,	water	and	non‐renewable	energy	sources,	and	the	search	for	new	places	where	
resource	extraction	can	continue,	ensure	the	continuing	value	of	these	in	the	global	marketplace.	
For	 example,	 while	 some	 capitalist	 enterprises	 have	 embraced	 ‘green	 capitalism’	 and	 new	
technologies	that	are	meant	to	be	more	environmentally	benign,	the	overarching	trend	has	been	
for	continued	reliance	upon	 the	 ‘old’	extraction	 industries	such	as	coal,	 gas	and	oil.	These	are	
being	 supplemented	 by	 newer	 forms	 of	 energy	 extraction,	 the	 so‐called	 ‘extreme	 energy’	
industries.	This	 refers	 to	novel	 forms	of	 ecologically	unsound	energy	extraction:	mountaintop	
removal,	deep‐water	drilling	and	hydraulic	‘fracking’	(Crook	and	Short	2014).	In	the	neo‐liberal	
universe,	 the	 global	 status	quo	 is	 protected	under	 the	 guise	 of	 arguments	 about	 the	 ‘national	
interest’	 and	 the	 importance	 of	 ‘free	 trade’,	 which	 usually	 reflect	 specific	 sectoral	 business	
interests.	This	is	most	evident	in	state	support	in	countries	like	Australia,	Canada	and	the	United	
States	 for	 the	 oil,	 gas	 and	 coal	 industries,	 deep‐drilling	 oil	 exploration,	 and	 mega‐mines.	
Concerted	 resistance	 to	 global	 agreements	 on	 carbon	 emissions	 and	 use	 of	 carbon	 taxes	
accompanies	this	support	for	these	industries.	The	consequence	of	such	activities	contributes	to	
even	more	 ruthless	 exploitation	of	 rapidly	vanishing	natural	 resources,	 as	well	 as	 the	 further	
diminishment	of	air,	soil	and	water	quality,	thereby	exacerbating	the	competition	by	individuals,	
groups	and	nations	for	what	is	left.		
	
The	notion	of	environmental	insecurity	is	usually	tied	to	actions	and	conditions	that	undermine	
the	ability	to	exploit	or	use	nature	sufficiently	to	meet	human	needs	(Hall	2013).	Scarcity	is	tied	
to	the	over‐exploitation	of	natural	resources.	It	is	also	increasingly	linked	to	the	consequences	of	
global	 warming.	 The	 choices	 ingrained	 in	 environmental	 exploitation	 stem	 from	 systemic	
imperatives	to	exploit	the	planetary	environment	for	production	of	commodities	for	human	use.	
How	humans	produce,	consume	and	reproduce	 their	conditions	of	 life	 is	 socially	patterned	 in	
ways	that	are	dominated	by	global	corporate	interests	and	those	of	the	hegemonic	nation‐states	
(Stretesky,	Lynch	and	Long	2014).	The	power	of	consumerist	ideology	and	practice	manifests	in	
the	 way	 in	which	 certain	 forms	 of	 production	 and	 consumption	 become	 part	 of	 a	 taken‐for‐
granted	 commonsense,	 the	 experiences	 and	 habits	 of	 everyday	 life	 (Agnew	 2013).	 Insecurity	
relates	 to	 the	 biophysical	 and	 socio‐economic	 consequences	 of	 various	 sources	 of	 threat	 and	
damage	 to	 the	 environment	 including	 pollution,	 resource	 degradation,	 biodiversity	 loss	 and	
climate	change	(South	2012;	White	2014).	
	
One	 result	of	 the	 regimes	and	routines	 that	sustain	contemporary	social	 life	 is	 the	 systematic	
transformation	of	nature,	as	species	decline	and	ecosystems	are	radically	altered	(White	2011b).	
The	 moral	 universe	 (for	 example,	 the	 primacy	 of	 individualism	 and	 anthropocentrism)	 and	
material	space	(that	 is,	 the	comparative	economic	prosperity	of	advanced	capitalist	countries)	
within	which	these	trends	occur	is	one	that	is	generally	supportive	of	this	sort	of	natural	resource	
exploitation.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 ravaging	 of	 nature	 takes	 place	 with	 the	 consent	 of	 its	
beneficiaries,	among	whom	are	the	general	populaces	of	advanced	 industrialised	countries.	 In	
part	this	is	due	to	the	fact	that	the	‘externalities’	of	environmental	degradation	and	destruction	
(such	as	pollution,	toxic	waste	and	creation	of	wastelands)	frequently	occur	‘elsewhere’:	globally	
in	peripheral	countries	and	locally	in	marginalised	communities.		
	
Nonetheless,	there	are	limits	to	this	exploitation,	as	evidenced	by	the	increasing	scarcity	of	both	
non‐renewables	(for	example,	oil	and	minerals)	and	renewables	(for	example,	freshwater,	forests,	
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fertile	 soils).	 Sustainable	use	occurs	when	 the	underlying	 stock	 is	not	depleted	 in	quantity	or	
degraded	in	quality,	but	this	is	rarely	the	case	today.	Scarcity	can	arise	from:	
	
 depletion	or	degradation	of	the	resource	(supply)		
 increased	demand	for	it	(demand)		
 unequal	distribution	and/or	resource	capture	(structural	scarcity)	(Homer‐Dixon	1999).	
	
As	 Homer‐Dixon	 (1999:	 47)	 explains,	 these	 three	 factors	 are	 inter‐related:	 ‘[d]eforestation	
increases	the	scarcity	of	forest	resources,	water	pollution	increases	the	scarcity	of	clean	water,	
and	climate	change	increases	the	scarcity	of	the	regular	patterns	of	rainfall	and	temperature	on	
which	farmers	rely’.	
	
The	 accompanying	 insecurities	 and	 vulnerabilities	 ensure	 elite	 and	 popular	 support	 for	 self‐
interested	‘security’.	Accordingly,	a	‘fortress	mentality’	is	being	constructed	and	reconstructed	at	
individual,	local,	national	and	regional	levels,	as	both	an	attitude	of	mind	and	a	material	reality	
(White	 2014).	 Donald	 Trump’s	 cry	 to	 ‘Make	 America	 Great	 Again’	 likewise	 taps	 into	 this	
sentiment.	The	net	result	is	that	security	is	being	built	upon	a	platform	of	state,	corporate	and	
organised	 group	wrongdoing	 and	 injustice,	 in	many	 instances	with	 the	 implied	 and/or	 overt	
consent	of	relevant	publics.	Much	of	this	can	in	turn	be	conceptualised	as	a	form	of	state‐corporate	
crime.	This	has	been	defined	as	‘illegal	or	socially	injurious	actions	that	result	from	a	mutually	
reinforcing	 interaction	between	(1)	policies	and/or	practices	 in	pursuit	of	 the	goals	of	one	or	
more	institutions	of	political	governance	and	(2)	policies	and/or	practices	in	pursuit	of	the	goals	
of	one	or	more	institutions	of	economic	production	and	distribution’	(Michalowski	and	Kramer	
2006:	15).	
	
The	notion	of	state‐corporate	crime	is	particularly	apt	in	regards	exploitation	of	the	environment.	
The	 securitisation	of	nature	 is	 constructed	around	 two	key	allied	 forces:	 (1)	natural	 resource	
extraction	industries	and	specific	companies;	and	(2)	nation‐states	that	exert	hegemonic	power	
and	 control	 over	 natural	 resources.	 In	 effect,	 national	 security	 is	 basically	 being	 defined	 as	
company	security	in	regards	access	to	and	exploitation	of	natural	resources.		
	
The	centrality	of	resource	issues	has	been	examined	at	length	by	Klare	(2012),	who	points	out	
that	 it	 is	 especially	 important	 for	 those	 states	 that	 depend	 on	 raw	material	 imports	 for	 their	
industrial	 prowess.	 Demand	 is	 escalating	 worldwide	 for	 commodities	 of	 all	 types	 (energy,	
consumer	 goods,	 food),	 accompanied	 by	 huge	 population	 growth	 and	 rising	 affluence	 via	
economic	expansion	in	places	such	as	China	and	India.	Increasingly,	there	are	scarcities	of	specific	
resources	 (for	 example,	 forest	 cover,	 marine	 fisheries,	 freshwater	 systems	 and	 fossil	 fuels),	
leading	to	a	proliferation	of	ownership	contests	(for	example,	disputed	islands	involving	China,	
Vietnam,	the	Philippines	and	Japan;	re‐drawing	of	boundaries	in	the	Arctic	among	border	states	
such	 as	 Russia,	 Canada,	 Norway	 and	 the	 United	 States)	 (see,	 for	 example,	 Brisman	 2013a).	
Meanwhile,	to	guard	against	immediate	food	shortages,	government‐backed	agricultural	firms	in	
China,	South	Korea,	Saudi	Arabia,	and	the	United	Arab	Emirates	are	already	buying	large	tracts	of	
arable	land	in	Africa	and	elsewhere	to	provide	food	for	consumption	at	home	(Brisman	2013b).	
Security	is	being	sought	through	the	appropriation	of	resources	in	specific	biosocial	locations.	
	
Security	is	substantially	constructed	around	the	notion	of	control	over	resources,	enforced	by	the	
viewpoint	that	‘Might	Makes	Right’.	National	security	can	be	conceptualised	as	being	more	than	
just	military	strength,	as	also	encompassing	territorial	inviolability,	and	economic	and	political	
interests	 that	protect	 the	value	and	stability	of	 the	state.	Moreover,	 environmental	 security	 is	
basically	 defined	 in	 relation	 to	 specific	 corporate	 and	 national	 interests,	 and	 threats	 to	 these	
interests.	 Such	 conceptions	 reflect	 peculiarly	 narrow	 notions	 of	 ‘security’,	 rather	 than	 those	
premised	upon	either	universal	human	 interest	 (such	as	 food	security,	 air	 security	and	water	
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security	for	all)	or	the	intrinsic	worth	of	animals,	plants	and	specific	eco‐systems	as	such.	It	is	
here	that	corruption	is	also	most	evident	with	respect	to	environmental	issues	in	Australia.		
	
Corruption	and	natural	resource	exploitation	
Corruption	 and	 natural	 resource	 extraction	 have	 long	 gone	 hand‐in‐hand,	 especially	 in	 the	
wildlife	and	forestry	sectors.	Securitisation,	in	this	context,	 is	about	securing	sectional	 interest	
advantage	for	governments	and	for	companies.	In	regards	to	environmental	crimes,	corruption	is	
evident	 in	 activities	 such	 as	 payment	 of	 bribes	 to	 government	 officials	 or	 politicians	 for	
preferential	 treatment;	 extortion	 by	 officials	 for	 operators	 to	 artificially	 legalise	 illegal	
operations;	 evading	 of	 national	 regulations	 with	 relative	 impunity;	 and	 bribing	 customs	 and	
border	 security	 personnel	 to	 ignore	 smuggling	 (INTERPOL‐UN	 Environment	 2016;	 Van	 Dinh	
2012;).	 But	 corruption	 always	 occurs	 in	 specific	 places,	 involves	 specific	 actors,	 and	 involves	
concrete	activities	such	as	bribery	and	abuse	of	office.	The	nature	and	extent	of	corruption	will	
vary	 from	 country	 to	 country	 and	 situation	 to	 situation,	 as	 will	 the	 officials	 working	 in	
enforcement,	 detection,	 prosecution,	 the	 judiciary	 and	 policy‐making	 who	 are	 implicated	 in	
corruption	(United	Nations	Office	on	Drugs	and	Crime	2012).		
	
Propaganda	to	the	contrary	notwithstanding	(‘it	does	not	happen	here’),	corruption	is	ubiquitous:	
that	is,	it	is	a	Western	as	well	as	non‐Western	phenomenon	(see,	for	example,	Whyte	2015).	Just	
as	the	corporation	is	inherently	criminogenic	(Bakan	2004;	Glasbeek	2004),	so	too,	is	business	
involving	natural	resource	extraction	fundamentally	and	profoundly	tainted	by	moral	and	direct	
corruption.	
	
The	flipside	of	corruption	is	regulation.	What	companies	can	or	cannot	do	is	very	much	dictated	
by	the	laws	and	regulatory	regime	that	guide	natural	resource	use	and	extraction.	Short	of	direct	
corruption,	there	are	many	ways	in	which	lack	of	adequate	regulation	can	itself	be	seen	as	a	form	
of	corrupted	practice.	For	instance,	in	supporting	economic	development,	the	state	can	cut	costs	
and	 encourage	 business	 growth	 by	 narrowing	 the	 scope	 of	 its	 purview	 and	 involvement	 in	
regulation.	 This	 reduction	 can	 take	 several	 different	 forms,	 such	 as	 cuts	 in	 state	 resources	
allocated	to	environmental	audits	(for	example,	botany	mapping),	or	the	censoring	of	scientific	
information	which	may	be	publicly	sensitive	for	specific	industries	(for	example,	fishing,	forestry,	
mining)	or	 for	private	 contract	partners	of	government	 (for	 example,	water	 treatment	plants,	
power	station	operators).	
	
The	state,	nevertheless,	has	a	 formal	 role	and	commitment	 to	protect	 citizens	 from	 the	worst	
excesses	or	worst	instances	of	environmental	victimisation.	Hence,	the	introduction	of	extensive	
legislation	and	regulatory	procedures	designed	to	give	the	appearance	of	active	intervention,	and	
the	implication	that	laws	exist	which	actually	do	deter	such	harms.	The	existence	of	such	laws	
may	be	encouraging	 in	 that	 they	reflect	historical	and	ongoing	struggles	over	certain	 types	of	
business	activity.		
	
The	regulation	of	environmental	harm,	however,	whether	it	be	in	the	areas	of	risk	assessment,	
management	 of	 specific	 incidents	 or	 consumption‐related	 activity,	 is	 inextricably	 intertwined	
with	capitalist	accumulation.	The	most	blatant	or	worst	instances	of	environmental	victimisation	
and	destruction	may	be	subject	to	state	sanction.	But	even	this	generally	begs	the	issue	of	the	
capacity	of	capital,	particularly	transnational,	to	defend	its	interests	through	legal	and	extra‐legal	
means.	It	has	been	observed,	for	example,	that	the	broad	tendency	under	neo‐liberalism	has	been	
toward	de‐regulation	(or,	as	a	variation	of	this,	‘self‐regulation’)	when	it	comes	to	corporate	harm	
and	 wrongdoing	 (Snider	 2000).	 In	 the	 specific	 area	 of	 environmental	 regulation,	 the	 role	 of	
government	remains	central,	even	if	only	by	the	absence	of	state	intervention.	The	general	trend	
has	been	away	from	direct	governmental	regulation	and	toward	‘softer’	regulatory	approaches.	
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This,	too,	opens	the	door	to	corrupted	governmental	processes.	Consider,	for	example,	the	notion	
of	 regulatory	 capture.	 The	 concept	 of	 regulatory	 capture	 refers	 to	 the	 situation	 where	 a	
government	 agency	 is	 dominated	 by	 the	 very	 businesses	 and	 corporations	 it	 is	 meant	 to	 be	
regulating.	For	instance,	Simon	(2000)	describes	many	instances	in	which	the	US	Environmental	
Protection	Agency	(EPA)	seemed	to	be	more	concerned	with	protecting	corporate	interests	than	
with	 protecting	 the	 environment.	 An	 example	 of	 this	 was	 a	 study	 that	 showed	 that	 the	 EPA	
devoted	 more	 of	 its	 resources	 in	 terms	 of	 time	 and	 money	 in	 the	 early	 1990s	 to	 exempt	
corporations	 from	 its	 regulations	 than	 it	 did	 to	 enforce	 the	 regulations.	EPA	activity	had	 also	
extended	 to	 opposing	 congressional	 attempts	 to	 pass	 tougher	 environmental	 regulations.	
Meanwhile,	 many	 former	 officials	 within	 the	 EPA	 ended	 up	 taking	 jobs	 as	 waste‐industry	
executives.	In	terms	of	both	activities	and	exchange	of	personnel,	such	situations	serve	private	
rather	than	public	interests.		
	
When	the	US	EPA	does	exert	 its	regulatory	muscle,	it	 immediately	experiences	pushback	from	
powerful	interests	in	the	form	of	lawsuits	(from	state	governments	as	well	as	corporations)	and,	
more	recently	under	the	Trump	administration,	the	threatened	closure	of	the	agency.		
	
The	 political	 context	within	which	 economic	 growth	 and	 development	 (as	 narrowly	 defined)	
occurs	 has	 a	 major	 bearing	 on	 both	 the	 regulatory	 environment	 and	 the	 types	 of	 activities	
garnering	state	 support.	As	 far	back	as	 the	 late	1990s,	Brunton	 (1999:	141)	observed	 that,	 in	
relation	to	Australian	regional	governments:	
	
The	 States	 and	 Territories	 have	 restricted	 sources	 of	 revenues	 and	 thus	 are	
constrained	and	limited	in	their	policy	choice.	One	area	under	their	control	with	
the	potential	 for	 expansion	 is	natural	 resources.	Thus	 the	 State	 and	Territories	
understandably	 become	 committed	 to	 their	 exploitation,	 and	 consequently,	
generally	hostile	to	conservation.	They	are	always	tempted	to	maximise	resource	
throughput	 in	 the	 short	 term	 rather	 than	 to	 husband	 resources	 for	 an	 optimal	
return	over	time.	This	results	in	a	strong,	at	times	authoritarian,	commitment	to	
‘development’	at	any	cost.	
	
After	assessing	the	state	of	Australian	environmental	policy,	Brunton	(1999:	142)	argued	that,	
particularly	in	relation	to	biological	diversity,	greenhouse	gas	emissions	and	endangered	species,	
voluntary	 and	 non‐regulatory	measures	 had	 not	 been	 very	 successful	 and	 should	 have	 been	
rejected.		
	
The	 failures	 of	 existing	 regulation	 also	 need	 to	 be	 placed	 in	 the	 context	 of	 processes	 that	
specifically	 impede	 its	 development	 and	 implementation	 and,	 in	 particular,	 corruption.	 This	
article	began	with	definition	of	two	types	of	corruption:	moral	corruption	and	direct	corruption.	
Resource	extraction	provides	substantive	examples	of	each.		
	
Forests	
Research	has	shown	that	deliberately	light‐handed	forms	of	regulation	in	the	forestry	industry	in	
Tasmania	have	been	accompanied	by	lack	of	transparency,	absence	of	third	party	oversight	and	
a	privileging	of	 the	economic	over	 the	ecological	 (Hollander	2006;	Pearce	2007).	 In	part,	 this	
approach	 stems	 from	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 regulator	 itself	 is	 intertwined	 with	 the	 commercial	
enterprise.	The	state	has	a	financial	interest	in	ensuring	an	economic	return	from	logging	in	state	
forests,	 as	 managed	 under	 a	 corporatised	 state	 company,	 Forestry	 Tasmania	 (soon	 to	 be	
rebranded—during	 2016‐17—by	 the	 Liberal	 Government	 as	 ‘Sustainable	 Timber	 Tasmania’).	
The	regulators	and	the	 foresters	are	drawn	from	the	same	pool	of	people	and	share	a	similar	
interest	in	enabling	rather	than	fettering	logging	activity.	Regulators	who	have	tried	to	‘do	their	
job’	by	enforcing	rules	and	guidelines	have	been	shifted	out	of	their	job	and	publicly	denigrated	
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by	top	politicians	in	public	forums	in	which	forestry	regulation	has	been	the	key	item	(Pearce	
2007).		
	
Abuse	of	governmental	procedure	and	process	was	evident	in	regards	to	the	proposed	pulp	mill	
in	northern	Tasmania	in	the	early	2000s.	The	proposal	was	put	forward	by	Gunns	Limited,	at	the	
time	the	largest	forest	products	company	in	Australia.	Environmental	impact	assessment	of	the	
project	was	initially	carried	out	by	the	formal	regulator	in	charge	of	evaluating	such	proposals,	
the	Resource	Planning	and	Development	Commission	(RPDC).	As	an	independent	body,	the	RPDC	
was	 committed	 to	 a	 process	 that	 was	 time	 consuming	 precisely	 because	 it	 is	 rigorous,	
transparent,	involved	public	hearings	and	included	the	testing	of	evidence	by	cross‐examination	
(Stokes	 2011).	 Part	 way	 into	 the	 assessment	 of	 the	 pulp	 mill	 proposal,	 however,	 Gunns	
announced	it	was	withdrawing	from	the	process,	ostensibly	because	of	the	length	of	time	it	was	
taking.		
	
In	 response,	 the	 government	 ‘pursued	Gunns	with	 offers	 of	 a	 new	and	 simplified	 assessment	
process	which	was	much	more	likely	to	lead	to	approval’	(Stokes	2011:	126).	To	achieve	this,	the	
normal	 planning	 system	 processes	 and	 its	 bodies	 (such	 as	 the	 RPDC)	 had	 to	 be	 bypassed.	
Accordingly,	new	legislation	was	framed	and	passed.	The	Pulp	Mill	Assessment	Act	2007	(TAS)	was	
rushed	 through	 parliament	 that	 opened	 the	 way,	 at	 the	 State	 level,	 for	 a	 more	 quick	 and	
favourable	 assessment	 of	 the	 project.	 Unlike	 the	 RPDC,	 however,	 where	 the	 Commonwealth	
Government	 had	 certified	 its	 assessment	 as	 meeting	 all	 Commonwealth	 assessment	
requirements,	 the	 new	 system	 meant	 that	 the	 Commonwealth	 now	 had	 to	 conduct	 its	 own	
assessment.	 Thus,	 not	 only	 had	 the	 Tasmanian	 government	 capitulated	 to	 the	 threats	 of	 the	
company	 to	 walk	 away	 from	 this	 state	 development,	 it	 simultaneously	 hand‐balled	 the	 key	
decision‐making	to	the	federal	level.		
	
All	this	took	place	in	a	political	environment	in	which	Gunns	Limited	had	issued	writs	against	20	
environmental	 activists.	 This	 occurred	 in	 2004,	 as	 the	 timber	 company	 sued	 a	 group	 of	
environmentalists,	protestors	and	Green	MPs	 for	AU$6.3	million.	This	has	been	 interpreted	as	
having	the	consequence	of	being	a	Strategic	Lawsuit	Against	Public	Participation	(SLAPP)	insofar	
as	it	tied	up	environmental	critics	in	litigation	and	managed	to	silence	a	few	of	those	subject	to	
the	writ	(see	White	2011a).	This	occurred	as	a	prelude	to	public	discussion	over	the	pros	and	
cons	of	the	proposed	pulp	mill.	The	SLAPP	suit	cast	a	long	shadow	over	the	pulp	mill	proposal	
and	some	of	 the	key	actors	engaged	 in	 it.	Members	of	parliament	who	voted	 for	changing	 the	
planning	assessment	process	specifically	in	regards	the	proposed	pulp	mill	were	more	than	aware	
of	the	bullying	by	Gunns	on	related	matters.		
	
A	final	illustration,	also	taken	from	Tasmania,	reinforces	the	primacy	of	economy	over	ecology	
and	the	efforts	of	governments	to	ensure	this.	This	time	the	object	of	attention	was	an	endangered	
species	of	bird—the	Swift	Parrot—which	was	being	threatened	by	human	impacts	on	its	habitat,	
in	particular,	forestry	operations.	To	protect	such	species,	there	is	a	raft	of	specific	federal	and	
state	laws	and	regulations.	The	Threatened	Species	Protection	Act	1995	(TAS),	for	example,	has	
provisions	 for	 charging	 those	 who	 harm	 endangered	 species	 as	 well	 as	 to	 conserve	 areas	 of	
habitat	 of	 a	 listed	 species.	 As	 commentators	 have	 argued,	 however,	 the	 existence	 of	 legal	
processes	 and	 protection	 laws	 at	 all	 levels	 of	 government	 has	 been	 for	 nought	 (Allchin,	
Kirkpatrick	and	Kriwoken	2013).	This	is	because	of	a	fundamental	reluctance	to	prevent	habitat	
loss.	
	
The	brazenness	of	governments	in	changing	legislation	when	faced	with	legal	action	that	would	
have	helped	protect	the	species,	the	unwillingness	of	ministers	to	reject	developments	of	any	kind	
that	would	impact	upon	the	Swift	Parrot,	and	the	persistent	understaffing	of	those	parts	of	the	
bureaucracy	working	 to	protect	species,	 all	 suggest	 that	 the	priority	 for	decision	makers	 is	 to	
avoid	situations	in	which	substantive	consideration	of	threatened	species’	values	interferes	with	
the	primacy	of	economic	growth	(Allchin,	Kirkpatrick	and	Kriwoken	2013).		
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As	with	the	Gunns	Limited	pulp	mill	proposal,	when	legitimate	regulations	and	laws	are	perceived	
to	stifle	economic	development,	 the	 solution	on	 the	part	of	 government	 is	 to	change	 the	 laws	
rather	 than	 adhere	 to	 time‐honoured	 processes	 and	 ecological	 common	 sense.	 The	 moral	
corruption	is	blatant	but	unapologetic.		
	
Oil	and	gas	
So,	 too,	 is	 corruption	 at	 the	 international	 level,	 especially	 when	 it	 involves	 the	 Australian	
government	and	protection	of	its	perceived	‘national	interests’.	The	example	here	relates	to	the	
Timor	Gap	Treaty	and	independence	of	Timor‐Leste	in	2002.		
	
In	1989,	Australia	and	Indonesia	signed	the	Timor	Gap	Treaty	when	Timor‐Leste	(or	East	Timor)	
was	still	under	 Indonesian	occupation.	 In	2002,	Timor‐Leste	gained	 its	 independence	and	 the	
Timor	Sea	Treaty	was	signed,	but	no	permanent	maritime	border	was	negotiated.	The	new	nation,	
Timor‐Leste,	argued	that	the	border	should	sit	halfway	between	it	and	Australia.	This	would	have	
placed	most	of	the	Greater	Sunrise	oil	and	gas	field	in	their	territory,	a	field	worth	an	estimated	
AU$40	billion.	Australia	begged	to	differ	and,	in	the	event,	negotiated	a	treaty	which	ruled	that	
revenue	from	the	oil	and	gas	field	would	be	split	evenly	between	the	two	countries.	As	part	of	the	
2006	Certain	Maritime	Arrangements	in	the	Timor	Sea	(CMATS)	treaty,	East	Timor	agreed	to	a	
clause	that	put	a	50‐year	hold	on	negotiating	a	permanent	maritime	border.	
	
What	was	not	known	at	the	time	was	that	the	negotiations	were	unequal	due	to	the	bugging	of	an	
East	Timor	cabinet	office	during	the	negotiations.	This	began	in	2004	when,	under	the	guise	of	an	
aid	project	to	help	renovate	the	Palace	of	Government	 in	Dili	(the	capital	city	of	Timor‐Leste),	
spies	 from	 Australia’s	 foreign	 intelligence	 service—the	 Australian	 Secret	 Intelligence	 Service	
(ASIS)—clandestinely	 made	 their	 way	 in	 and	 installed	 listening	 devices.	 The	 operation	 saw	
transcripts	 of	 top‐secret	 conversations	 conducted	 by	 East	 Timor’s	 negotiating	 team	 hand‐
delivered	 to	 the	 Australian	 negotiating	 team,	 giving	 them	 an	 advantage	 during	 treaty	 talks	
(Cannane	2016c).		
	
Timor‐Leste’s	 Prime	 Minister	 Rui	 Maria	 de	 Araujo	 called	 it	 a	 ‘moral	 crime’	 in	 2015;	 former	
president	Xanana	Gusmão	said	he	considered	 it	 a	criminal	act	 (Cannane,	Koloff	 and	Andersen	
2015a).	As	observed	by	Peter	Galbraith,	a	former	American	diplomat	and	lead	negotiator	for	East	
Timor	during	the	treaty	talks	with	Australia:	
	
I’m	not	an	expert	on	Australian	law,	but	what	is	clear	is	Australia	was	not	doing	
this	for	national	security	reasons,	 it	was	doing	it	 for	its	commercial	interests,	to	
help	oil	companies	and	to	secure	additional	revenue	for	the	Treasury.	(quoted	in	
Cannane,	Koloff	and	Andersen	2015b)		
	
When	 Timor‐Leste	 took	 the	 case	 to	 the	 Permanent	 Court	 of	 Arbitration	 in	 The	 Hague,	 a	 key	
witness	on	their	behalf	was	not	there	(Cannane	2016a).	This	was	‘Witness	K’,	a	former	senior	ASIS	
officer	who	found	the	whole	operation	morally	offensive,	especially	given	that	the	focus	of	ASIS	
at	the	time	was	supposed	to	be	on	preventing	 further	terrorist	attacks	 in	the	region.	(The	Dili	
bugging	operation	began	18	months	after	the	Bali	bombing	terrorist	attacks).	In	2013,	Witness	K	
was	set	to	give	evidence	in	The	Netherlands,	but	the	Australian	Security	Intelligence	Organisation	
(ASIO)	 raided	his	home	and	seized	his	passport,	 and	he	has	been	prevented	 from	 leaving	 the	
country	to	this	day	(Cannane	2016b;	Cannane,	Koloff	and	Andersen	2015b).	In	the	same	year	the	
Attorney‐General	 of	 Australia,	 George	 Brandis,	 authorised	 an	 ASIO	 raid	 on	 East	 Timor’s	
Australian	 lawyer	 Bernard	 Collaery,	 in	 which	 about	 a	 dozen	 agents	 entered	 his	 office	 and	
confiscated	legal	documents,	electronic	files	and	the	statement	by	the	former	ASIS	agent	alleging	
the	eavesdropping	operation	(Allard	2014).		
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In	response	to	these	actions,	Australia	was	ordered	to	cease	spying	on	East	Timor	and	its	legal	
advisors	in	a	landmark	decision	by	the	International	Court	of	Justice	(ICJ).	The	ICJ	is	the	United	
Nation’s	 top	 court,	 and	 its	 decisions	 are	 bindings	 on	members.	 The	 court	 also	 ruled	 that	 the	
Australian	government	must	seal	documents	and	data	seized	in	the	December	2013	ASIO	raid	so	
that	they	cannot	be	accessed	or	used	by	the	government	(Allard	2014).		
	
The	 Permanent	 Court	 of	 Arbitration	 agreed	 to	 take	 up	 the	 dispute	 between	 Timor‐Leste	 and	
Australia	over	the	oil	and	gas	field.	It	ruled	that	the	dispute	should	be	settled	under	the	United	
Nations	Convention	of	the	Law	of	the	Sea	(UNCLOS)	rather	than	the	2006	Treaty	which	had	been	
negotiated	under	suspect	conditions	(namely,	spying	by	Australia).	Australia	withdrew	from	the	
compulsory	dispute	settlement	procedures	under	UNCLOS	in	2002,	however,	 just	two	months	
before	East	Timor	became	independent	(Cannane	2016c).		
	
In	 January	2017,	Timor‐Leste	dropped	 its	 spying	case	against	Australia	 as	part	of	 ‘good	 faith’	
negotiations	 to	 resolve	 the	 underlying	 disagreement	 over	maritime	 boundaries	 (Everingham	
2017).	The	CMATS	treaty	had	earlier	been	terminated	by	Timor‐Leste,	a	decision	that	Australia	
accepted.	In	September	2017,	the	Permanent	Court	of	Arbitration	in	The	Hague	announced	that	
Australia	and	Timor‐Leste	had	resolved	their	dispute	by	reaching	an	agreement	over	the	disputed	
territory.	Details	of	the	agreement	remained	confidential	but	the	Court	said	that	it	addressed	the	
legal	status	of	 the	Greater	Sunrise	gas	 field	and	the	sharing	of	 the	resulting	revenue	(Norman	
2017).	The	deal	was	to	be	finalised	in	October	2017.	
	
Mining	
The	mining	 industry	 is	 powerful	 and	 those	 involved	with	 it	 are	 likewise	 in	 a	position	 to	gain	
substantial	rewards.	It	is	in	this	domain	that	we	have	a	clear‐cut	instance	of	direct	corruption,	as	
well	as	continuing	problems	with	morally	corrupt	decision‐making.		
	
The	 New	 South	 Wales	 Independent	 Commission	 Against	 Corruption	 (ICAC)	 prosecuted	 two	
former	Labor	ministers,	Eddie	Obeid	and	Ian	Macdonald,	in	2014.	Macdonald	was	prosecuted	for	
two	 alleged	 offences	 of	 misconduct	 in	 public	 office	 over	 the	 awarding	 of	 a	 mining	 license.	
Specifically,	 ICAC’s	 Operation	 Acacia	 investigated	 the	 former	 resources	minister’s	 decision	 to	
award	the	Doyles	Creek	mining	license	in	2008	to	the	then‐chairmen	of	Doyles	Creek	Mining,	John	
Maitland,	a	 former	mining	union	boss,	without	a	competitive	tender	and	against	departmental	
advice.	Meanwhile,	among	other	charges,	Obeid	was	found	to	be	corrupt	for	misusing	his	position	
as	a	Member	of	Parliament	to	benefit	his	family’s	financial	interests	in	granting	generous	water	
licenses	over	their	Bylong	Valley	farm	(Carter	2016;	Hoerr	2016).		
	
The	 Doyles	 Creek	 mining	 license	 was	 subsequently	 cancelled	 in	 accordance	 with	 legislation	
passed	in	the	NSW	State	parliament.	The	introduction	of	the	Mining	and	Petroleum	Legislation	
Amendment	Bill	2014	came	two	months	after	the	ICAC	recommended	licenses	for	three	mines	be	
cancelled,	after	corruption	findings	against	former	Labor	MP	Eddie	Obeid,	former	mining	minister	
Ian	 Macdonald	 and	 union	 official	 John	 Maitland.	 Doyles	 Creek	 licensee,	 NuCoal	 Resources,	
immediately	 threatened	 to	mount	 a	 constitutional	 challenge	 to	 the	 bill,	which	would	 offer	no	
compensation	for	the	losses	incurred.	The	legislation	was	designed	to	indemnify	taxpayers	from	
any	possible	claims	relating	to	the	issuing	or	cancellation	of	the	licences.		
	
The	coal	companies	embroiled	in	the	ICAC	inquiry	into	the	corrupt	dealings	around	the	granting	
of	 the	 licences	had	asked	the	state	government	not	 to	strike	out	 their	mining	 licences.	A	High	
Court	ruling	in	April	2015,	however,	upheld	the	New	South	Wales	legislation	that	struck	out	their	
exploration	 licenses	 (Foschia	 2015).	 Nonetheless,	 Doyles	 Creek	 owners,	 NuCoal	 Resources	
(which	includes	US‐based	investors),	continued	to	pursue	the	matters	through	the	NSW	Supreme	
Court	and	under	the	US‐Australia	Free	Trade	Agreement.		
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The	 ICAC	had	 found	that	 former	Labor	mining	minister	 Ian	Macdonald	had	acted	corruptly	 in	
2008	by	giving	a	coal	exploration	licence	to	Doyles	Creek	Mining,	a	company	then	chaired	by	his	
‘mate’	and	former	union	boss	John	Maitland.	In	addition,	three	other	members	of	the	company,	
Andrew	Pool,	Craig	Ransley	and	Mike	Chester	were	found	to	have	acted	corruptly	by	making	or	
agreeing	 to	Mr	Maitland	making	 ‘false	 and	misleading’	 statements	 about	 a	proposed	 ‘training	
mine’	 at	 the	 site	 to	 the	Department	 of	 Primary	 Industries.	 Charges	 were	 subsequently	 filed	
against	Pool	and	Ransley	by	the	Department	of	Public	Prosecutions.	Another	High	Court	ruling	in	
2015,	 however,	 opened	 the	 door	 for	 a	 challenge	 to	 these	 charges.	 The	 commission	 had	long	
operated	on	the	basis	that	‘corrupt	conduct’	as	defined	in	the	ICAC	Act	1988	(NSW)	extended	to	
cases	in	which	private	citizens	misled	or	deceived	public	officials	to	gain	an	advantage.	But	the	
High	Court	ruled	(in	another	case)	that	the	public	official	must	also	be	involved	in	wrongdoing.	
The	ruling	does	not	affect	 findings	against	former	Ministers,	 such	as	 Ian	Macdonald	and	Eddie	
Obeid,	because	a	different	definition	of	corruption	applies	to	public	officials	(Whitbourn	2015).		
	
What	these	ongoing	cases	reveal	is	not	only	that	unethical	and	immoral	behaviour	occurs	but	the	
protagonists	will	also	do	all	they	can	to	delay	proceedings,	to	resist	the	labels,	to	file	counter‐suits,	
and	to	protect	their	commercial	interests	via	multiple	legal	means.	The	technicalities	of	the	law	
are	the	playground	of	the	rich	and	powerful.	Legal	proceedings	and	courtroom	battles	form	the	
lifeblood	 of	 contemporary	 capitalism.	 These	 extend	 to	 civil	 suits	 against	 critics	 and	 activists	
through	 to	 aggressive	 defence	 of	 sectoral	 and	 personal	 interests	 associated	 with	 particular	
industries.		
	
Those	who	blow	the	whistle	on	corporate	wrongdoing	find	that	career	and	life	afterwards	is	much	
more	difficult.	Sally	McDow,	a	highly	credentialed	lawyer	and	former	senior	compliance	manager	
of	Origin	Energy,	 found	 this	 to	be	 the	 case	 after	 she	had	 alleged	management	 cover‐ups.	The	
wrongdoings	 consisted	 of	 serious	 non‐compliance	with	 regulations	 relating	 to	 safety	 and	 the	
environment,	 including	for	hundreds	of	wells	 in	Australia	and	New	Zealand	that	had	not	been	
maintained	for	more	than	10	years,	leaks	of	oil	and	gas,	contaminations,	and	a	failure	to	inform	
regulators	or	the	Australian	Stock	Exchange	of	the	breaches.	The	misconduct	also	included	the	
material	altering	of	reports	to	the	board	on	risk	and	compliance	issues	(Ferguson	2017a,	2017b).	
Frequently	 it	 is	 the	whistleblower	who	 is	 vilified	 for	 taking	 a	moral	 stance,	 not	 the	offending	
company,	as	this	lawyer	was	to	subsequently	experience.		
	
Corruption	comes	in	various	guises	and	involves	different	sectors	and	stakeholders.	This	extends	
to	the	regulatory	process	as	much	as	to	breaches	of	the	law	per	se.	For	instance,	in	August	2015,	
the	 federal	 Environment	Department	 asked	 the	Chief	 Executive	 and	Australian	head	of	Adani	
Mining,	 Jeyakumar	 Janakaraj,	 about	 the	 environmental	 history	 of	 its	 executive	 officers.	 Adani	
Mining	is	the	key	proponent	of	the	multi‐billion	dollar	Carmichael	Mine	in	Central	Queensland.	
The	letter	requested	a	range	of	information	about	the	environmental	history	of	Adani’s	executive	
officers,	including:	
	
 whether	 or	 not	 [any	 executive	 officer]	 has	 been	 the	 subject	 of	 any	 civil	 or	 criminal	
penalties	 or	 compliance‐related	 finding,	 for	 breaches	 of,	 or	 non‐compliance	 with,	
environmental	laws;	
 whether	or	not	[any	executive	officer]	has	been	an	executive	officer	or	a	body	during	a	
time	when	that	body	was	the	subject	of	any	civil	and	criminal	penalties	or	compliance‐
related	 findings,	 for	 breaches	 of	 or	 non‐compliance	 with	 environmental	 laws,	 and	 an	
explanation	of	the	person’s	role	or	responsibility	in	relation	to	the	conduct	that	lead	to	
those	penalties	or	findings;	
 information	about	his	or	her	roles	both	in	Australia	and	in	other	countries;	
 information	about	both	the	executive	officer’s	history	with	the	relevant	entity	and	with	
other	entities,	whether	or	not	those	entities	are	related	to	the	Adani	Group;	
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 any	other	matters	which	Adani	Mining	considers	to	be	relevant	to	the	executive	officer’s	
history	in	relation	to	environmental	matters	(Willacy	2015).	
	
The	information	was	needed	for	the	Environment	Minister’s	assessment	of	Adani’s	proposed	$16	
billion	Carmichael	coal	mine.	The	Minister	approved	the	mega‐mine	in	October	2015.	After	the	
approval,	it	was	found	that	Mr	Janakaraj	had	been	the	director	of	operations	of	the	KCM	copper	
mine	 in	 Zambia	 when	 the	 company	 pleaded	 guilty	 to	 four	 charges,	 including	 polluting	 the	
environment	 (discharging	 dangerous	 contaminants	 into	 a	major	 river)	 and	wilfully	 failing	 to	
report	an	incident	of	pollution	(Willacy	2015).	The	failure	to	disclose	this	information,	both	in	the	
original	 assessment	 and	 later	 as	 requested	 by	 the	 Environment	 Department,	 did	 not	 affect	
subsequent	decisions	affecting	the	mine’s	approval.		
	
As	a	postscript	 to	 this	 story,	 in	December	2016,	 it	was	 reported	 that	 the	business	behind	 the	
planned	 Carmichael	 coal	mine	 is	 facing	multiple	 financial	 crime	 and	 corruption	 probes,	 with	
Indian	authorities	investigating	Adani	companies	for	siphoning	money	offshore	and	artificially	
inflating	power	prices	at	the	expense	of	Indian	consumers	(Long	2016c).	This	was	revealed	just	
days	after	the	Deputy	Prime	Minister,	Barnaby	Joyce,	told	the	Queensland	Media	Club	that	the	
Carmichael	coal	mine	and	rail	infrastructure	was	vital	for	the	state’s	economy	(Briggs	2016b;	see	
also	Burke	and	Clarke	2016).	He	also	appeared	to	downplay	concerns	about	Adani’s	eligibility	for	
public	finance	(eligibility	is	determined	on	the	basis	that	such	assistance	is	critical	to	a	project).	
Adani	had	applied	 for	 a	AU$1billion	 loan	under	 the	Northern	Australia	 Infrastructure	Facility	
(Briggs	2016c,	2016a).	Meanwhile,	during	the	same	period,	it	was	revealed	that	the	Adani	group	
had	set	up	in	Australia	a	complex	network	of	companies	and	trusts,	which	are	owned	in	one	of	
the	world’s	major	tax	havens,	the	Cayman	Islands	(Long	2016b,	2016a).	In	October	2017,	a	Four	
Corners	 investigation	 revealed	 troubling	 information	 about	 Adani’s	 operations	 in	 India,	 with	
allegations	that	the	company	regularly	flouted	environmental	regulations,	had	been	involved	in	
illegal	mining	and	shipping,	and	had	systematically	bribed	a	host	of	regulators,	public	officials	and	
politicians	(ABC	2017).		
	
As	these	brief	case	studies	illustrate,	there	are	numerous	instances	of	direct	and	moral	corruption	
across	 the	 natural	 resource	 sectors.	 Powerful	 interests	 are	 represented	 in	 the	 exploitation	 of	
natural	resources,	and	the	people	involved	are	not	only	ruthless	in	their	pursuit	of	advantage	and	
profit	but	are	also	remarkably	adept	at	evading,	delaying	and	neutralising	measures	designed	to	
hold	them	to	account,	whether	this	involves	international	or	Australian	courts,	federal	or	state	
regulators,	or	whistleblowers	from	within	the	industry.		
	
Conclusion	
Securitisation	 refers	 to	 the	 efforts	 of	 the	 powerful	 to	 secure	 financial	 rewards	 by	 controlling	
access	to	and	use	of	natural	resources.	This	may	be	rationalised	or	justified	under	the	rubric	of	
the	‘national	interest’	or	the	‘free	market’.	But,	whether	through	fair	means	(that	is,	legal)	or	foul	
(that	is,	illegal	and	criminal),	the	net	result	is	essentially	the	same:	the	exploitation	of	nature	in	
ways	that	favour	the	interests	of	the	powerful.		
	
Gaining	 unfair	 advantage,	 protecting	 specific	 sectoral	 interests	 and	 over‐riding	 existing	
environmental	 regulations	are	all	 features	of	moral	 and	direct	 corruption	associated	with	 the	
exploitation	 of	 natural	 resources.	 The	 result	 is	 lack	 of	 transparency,	 a	 substantial	 democratic	
deficit,	and	expenditure	of	public	monies,	time,	and	resources	in	support	of	environmentally	and	
socially	dubious	activities.	Not	all	forms	of	corruption,	as	described	here,	are	illegal,	although	all	
are	immoral	and	problematic.	They	are,	quite	simply,	wrong.	
	
Yet	the	notion	of	environmental	insecurity	(‘we	need	to	protect	our	national	interests’),	linked	to	
the	 notion	 of	 the	 need	 for	 jobs	 (‘the	 winners	 are	 local	 communities’),	 provides	 a	 powerful	
platform	upon	which	the	legitimacy	of	such	securitisation	of	nature	is	constructed.	So,	too,	is	the	
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notion	that	other	countries	are	corrupt	but	countries	such	as	Australia	are	governed	by	the	rule	
of	law	and	procedural	fairness,	and	a	political	system	that	allows	for	periodic	checks	and	balances	
on	public	officials.	There	is	a	certain	wilful	blindness	here,	one	that	fundamentally	needs	to	be	
challenged	and	contested,	since	it	hides	the	submerged	truths	that	corruption	is	not	only	present	
but	rampant	in	the	exploitation	of	natural	resources	in	Australia.		
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1	A	small	portion	of	the	discussions	of	environmental	security	herein	draw	upon	work	that	previously	appeared	 in	
White	 RD	 (2014)	 Environmental	 security	 and	 fortress	 mentality.	 International	 Affairs	 90(4):	 835‐851.	 DOI:	
10.1111/1468‐2346.12143.	
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